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Abstract
The need for countering Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) attacks has led to the solutions that ubiqui-
tously monitor system activities in each host, and per-
form timely attack investigation over the monitoring
data for analyzing attack provenance. However, ex-
isting query systems based on relational databases and
graph databases lack language constructs to express key
properties of major attack behaviors, and often execute
queries inefficiently since their semantics-agnostic de-
sign cannot exploit the properties of system monitoring
data to speed up query execution.
To address this problem, we propose a novel query
system built on top of existing monitoring tools and
databases, which is designed with novel types of opti-
mizations to support timely attack investigation. Our sys-
tem provides (1) domain-specific data model and stor-
age for scaling the storage, (2) a domain-specific query
language, Attack Investigation Query Language (AIQL)
that integrates critical primitives for attack investigation,
and (3) an optimized query engine based on the charac-
teristics of the data and the semantics of the queries to
efficiently schedule the query execution. We deployed
our system in NEC Labs America comprising 150 hosts
and evaluated it using 857 GB of real system monitor-
ing data (containing 2.5 billion events). Our evaluations
on a real-world APT attack and a broad set of attack
behaviors show that our system surpasses existing sys-
tems in both efficiency (124x over PostgreSQL, 157x
over Neo4j, and 16x over Greenplum) and conciseness
(SQL, Neo4j Cypher, and Splunk SPL contain at least
2.4x more constraints than AIQL).
1 Introduction
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks are sophis-
ticated (involving many individual attack steps across
many hosts and exploiting various vulnerabilities) and
stealthy (each individual step is not suspicious enough),
plaguing many well-protected businesses [9, 11, 15, 18,
27, 30]. A recent massive Equifax data breach [11] has
exposed the sensitive personal information of 143 mil-
lion US customers. In order for enterprises to counter
advanced attacks, recent approaches based on ubiquitous
system monitoring have emerged as an important solu-
tion for monitoring system activities and performing at-
tack investigation [37,42,47–49,54,57,58]. System mon-
itoring observes system calls at the kernel level to collect
system-level events about system activities. Collection
of system monitoring data enables security analysts to
investigate these attacks by querying risky system behav-
iors over the historical data [71].
Although attack investigation is performed after the at-
tacks compromise enterprises’ security, it is a consider-
ably time-sensitive task due to two major reasons. First,
advanced attacks include a sequence of steps and are per-
formed in multiple stages. A timely attack investigation
can help understand all attack behaviors and prevent the
further damage of the attacks. Second, understanding the
attack sequence is crucial to correctly patch the systems.
A timely attack investigation can pinpoint the vulnerable
components of the systems and protect the enterprises
from future attacks of the same types.
Challenges: However, there are two major challenges
for building a query system to support security analysts
in efficient and timely attack investigation.
Attack Behavior Specification: The system needs to
provide a query language with specialized constructs for
expressing various types of attack behaviors using sys-
tem monitoring data: (1) Multi-Step Attacks: risky
behaviors in advanced attacks typically involve activi-
ties that are related to each other based on either spe-
cific attributes (e.g., the same process reads a sensitive
file and accesses the network) or temporal relationships
(e.g., file read happens before network access), which
requires language constructs to easily specify relation-
ships among activities. In Fig. 1, the attacker runs osql
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Figure 1: Major types of attack behaviors (events e1, . . . ,en are shown in ascending temporal order)
.exe to cause the database sqlservr.exe to dump its data
into a file backup1.dmp. Later (i.e., e3 happens after e2;
temporal relationship), a malicious script sbblv.exe reads
from the dump backup1.dmp (i.e., the same dump file in e2
and e3; attribute relationship) and sends the data back
to the attacker. (2) Dependency Tracking of Attacks:
dependency analysis is often applied to track causality
of data for discovering the “attack entry” (i.e., prove-
nance) [48,49,61], which requires language constructs to
chain constraints among activities. In Fig. 1, a malicious
script info_strealer in Host 1 infects Host 2 via network
communications between apache and wget. (3) Abnormal
System Behaviors: frequency-based behavioral models
are often required to express abnormal system behaviors,
such as network access spikes [20, 29]. Investigating
such spikes requires the system to support sliding win-
dows and statistical aggregation of system activities, and
compare the aggregate results with either fixed thresholds
(in absolute sense) or the historical results (in relative
sense). In Fig. 1, a malicious script sbblv.exe sends a
large amount of data to a particular destination XXX.129.1
Big-Data Security Analysis: System monitoring pro-
duces a huge amount of daily logs [55,69] (∼ 50 GB per
day for 100 hosts), and the investigation of these attacks
typically requires enterprises to keep at least a 0.5 ∼ 1
year worth of data [32]. Such a big amount of security
data poses challenges for the system to meet the require-
ments of timely attack investigation.
Limitations of Existing Systems: Unfortunately, ex-
isting query systems do not address both of these in-
herent challenges in attack investigation. First, existing
query languages in relational databases based on SQL
and SPARQL [19,22,25] lack constructs for easily chain-
ing constraints among relations. Graph databases such
as Neo4j [16] and NoSQL tools such as MongoDB [38],
Splunk [23], and ElasticSearch [10] are ineffective in ex-
pressing event relationships where two events have no
common entities (e.g., e1 and e2 in Fig. 1). More impor-
tantly, none of these languages provide language con-
structs to express behavioral models with historical re-
1While existing complex event processing systems [3, 12, 21] sup-
port similar features, they operate over stream rather than historical
data stored in databases.
sults. Second, system monitoring data is generated with a
timestamp on a specific host in the enterprise, exhibiting
strong spatial and temporal properties. However, none
of these systems provide optimizations that exploit the
domain specific characteristics of the data, missing op-
portunities to optimize the system for supporting timely
attack investigation and often causing queries to run for
hours (e.g., performance evaluation results in Sec. 6.2.2).
Contributions: We design and build a novel system
for efficient attack investigation from system monitor-
ing data. We build our system (∼ 50,000 lines of Java
code) on top of existing system-level monitoring tools
(i.e., auditd [28] and ETW [13]) for data collection and
relational databases (i.e., PostgreSQL [19] and Green-
plum [14]) for data storage and query. This enables our
system to leverage the services provided by these ma-
ture infrastructures, such as data management, indexing
mechanisms, recovery, and security. In particular, our
system is designed with three novel types of optimiza-
tions. First, our system provides a domain-specific query
language, Attack Investigation Query Language (AIQL),
which is optimized to express the three aforementioned
types of attack behaviors. Second, our system provides
domain-specific data model and storage for scaling the
storage. Third, our system optimizes the query engine
based on the characteristics of the monitoring data and
the semantics of the queries to efficiently schedule the
query execution. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to accelerate attack investigation via optimizing
storage and query of system monitoring data.
1 agentid = 1 // host id; spatial constraints
2 (at "01/01/2017") // temporal constraints
3 proc p1 start proc p2["%telnet%"] as evt1
4 proc p3 start ip ipp[dstport = 4444] as evt2
5 proc p4["%apache%"] read file f1["/var/www%"] as evt3
6 with p2 = p3, // attribute relationship
7 evt1 before evt2, evt3 after evt2 // temporal
relationships
8 return p1, p2, p4, f1
Query 1: AIQL Query for CVE-2010-2075 [5]
Domain-Specific Query Language (Sec. 4): Our AIQL
language is designed for specifying the attack behaviors
shown in Fig. 1 (i.e., Query 7 in Sec. 6.2.1, Query 3 in
Sec. 4.2, and Query 5 in Sec. 6.2.1, respectively). Specif-
ically, AIQL provides language constructs to specify re-
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Figure 2: The AIQL system architecture
lationships among system activities (Sec. 4.1), chain
constraints among activities (Sec. 4.2), and compute
aggregate results in sliding time windows (Sec. 4.3).
AIQL adopts the {subject-operation-object} syntax to
represent system behavior patterns as events (e.g., proc
p1 write file f1) and supports attribute relationships
and temporal relationships of multiple events, as well
as syntax shortcuts based on context-aware inference
(Sec. 4.1). As shown in Query 1, AIQL can relate mul-
tiple system activities using spatial/temporal constraints
and attribute/temporal relationships.
Data Model and Storage (Sec. 3.2): Our system mod-
els system monitoring data as a sequence of events,
where each event describes how a process interacts with
a system resource, such as writing to a file. More impor-
tantly, our system clearly identifies the spatial and tem-
poral properties of the events, and leverages these proper-
ties to partition the data storage in both spatial and tem-
poral dimensions. Such partitioning presents opportuni-
ties for parallel processing of query execution (Sec. 5.2).
Query Scheduling (Sec. 5): Our system identifies both
spatial and temporal constraints in AIQL queries, and op-
timizes the query execution in two aspects: (1) for AIQL
queries that involve multiple event patterns, our system
prioritizes the search of event patterns with high pruning
power, maximizing the reduction of irrelevant events as
early as possible; (2) our system breaks down the query
into independent sub-queries along temporal and spatial
dimensions and executes them in parallel.
Evaluation: We deployed the AIQL system in NEC
Labs America comprising 150 hosts. We performed a
broad set of attack behaviors in the deployed environ-
ment, and evaluated the query performance and concise-
ness of AIQL against existing systems using 857 GB of
real system monitoring data (16 days; 2.5 billion events):
(1) our end-to-end efficiency evaluations on an APT at-
tack case study (27 queries) show that AIQL surpasses
both PostgreSQL (124x) and Neo4j (157x); (2) our per-
formance evaluations show that the query scheduling em-
ployed by AIQL is efficient in both single-node databases
(40x over PostgreSQL scheduling) and parallel databases
(16x over Greenplum scheduling); (3) our conciseness
evaluations on four major types of attack behaviors (19
queries) show that SQL, Neo4j Cypher, and Splunk SPL
contain at least 2.4x more constraints, 3.1x more words,
and 4.7x more characters than AIQL. All queries and a
demo video are available on our project website [1].
2 System Overview and Threat Model
Fig. 2 shows the AIQL system architecture: (1) we de-
ploy monitoring agents across servers, desktops and lap-
tops in the enterprise to monitor system activities by
collecting information about system calls from kernels.
The collected system monitoring data is then sent to
the central server and stored in our optimized data stor-
age (Sec. 3); (2) the language parser, implemented us-
ing ANTLR 4 [2], analyzes input queries and generates
query contexts. A query context is an object abstraction
of the input query that contains all the required informa-
tion for the query execution. Multievent syntax, depen-
dency syntax, and anomaly syntax are supported (Sec. 4);
(3) the query execution engine executes the generated
query contexts to search for the desired attack behav-
iors. Based on the data storage and the query seman-
tics, domain-specific optimizations, such as relationship-
based scheduling and temporal & spatial parallelization,
are adopted to speedup the query execution (Sec. 5).
Threat Model: Our thread model follows the threat
model of previous work [34, 48, 49, 54, 55]. We assume
that kernel is trusted, and the system monitoring data col-
lected from kernel is not tampered with [13, 28]. Any
kernel-level attack that deliberately compromises secu-
rity auditing systems is beyond the scope of this work.
3 Data Model and Storage
3.1 Data Model and Collection
System monitoring data records the interactions among
system resources as system events [48]. Each of the
recorded event occurs on a particular host at a particular
time, thus exhibiting strong spatial and temporal proper-
ties. Existing works have indicated that on most modern
operating systems (Windows, Linux and OS X), system
resources (system entities) in most cases are files, pro-
cesses, and network connections [42, 45, 48, 49]. Thus,
in our data model, we consider system entities as files,
processes, and network connections. We define a sys-
tem event as the interaction among two system entities
represented using the triple 〈subject, operation, object〉,
which consists of the initiator of the interaction, the type
Table 1: Representative attributes of system entities
Entity Attributes
File Name, Owner/Group, VolID, DataID, etc.
Process PID, Name, User, Cmd, Binary Signature, etc.
Network Connection IP, Port, Protocol
of the interaction, and the target of the interaction. Sub-
jects are processes originating from software applica-
tions such as Firefox, and objects can be files, processes
and network connections. We categorize system events
into three types according to their object entities, namely
file events, process events, and network events.
Both entities and events have critical security-related
attributes (Tables 1 and 2). The attributes of entities in-
clude the properties to support various security analyses
(e.g., file name, process name, and IP addresses), and the
unique identifiers to distinguish entities (e.g., file data ID
and process ID). The attributes of events include event
origins (i.e., agent ID and start time/end time), operations
(e.g., file read/write), and other security-related proper-
ties (e.g., failure code). Agent ID refers to the unique ID
of the host where the entity/event is observed.
Data Collection: We implement data collection agents
for Windows and Linux based on ETW event tracing [13]
and the Linux Audit Framework [28]. Tables 1 and 2
show representative attributes of our collected data.
3.2 Data Storage
After the modeling, we store the data in relational
databases powered by PostgreSQL [19]. Relational
databases come with mature indexing mechanisms and
are scalable to massive data. However, even with in-
dexes for speeding up queries, relational databases still
face challenges in handling high ingest rates of massive
system monitoring data. We next describe how we ad-
dress these challenges to optimize the database storage.
Time and Space Partitioning: System monitoring data
exhibits strong temporal and spatial properties: the data
collected from different agents is independent from each
other, and the timestamps of the collected data increase
monotonically. Queries of the data are often specified
with a specific time range or a host, or across many hosts
within some time interval. Therefore, when storing the
data, we partition the data in both the time and the space
dimensions: separating groups of agents into table par-
titions and generating one database per day for the data
collected on that day. We build various types of indexes
on the attributes that will be queried frequently, such as
executable name of process, name of file, source/destina-
tion IP of network connection.
Hypertable: For large organizations with hundreds or
thousands of machines, we scale the data storage using
MPP (massively parallel processing) databases Green-
plum [14]. These databases intelligently distribute the
Table 2: Representative attributes of system events
Operation Read/Write, Execute, Start/End, Rename/Delete
Time/Sequence Start Time/End Time, Event Sequence
Misc. Subject ID, Object ID, Failure Code
storage and search of events and entities based on the
spatial and temporal properties of our data model.
Time Synchronization: We correct potential time drift-
ing of events on agents by applying synchronization pro-
tocols like Network Time Protocol (NTP) [17] at the
client side, and checking with the clock at the server side.
4 Query Language Design
AIQL is designed to specify three types of attack behav-
iors: multi-step attacks, dependency tracking of attacks,
and abnormal system behaviors. In contrast to previous
query languages [7, 22, 23, 25] that focus on the speci-
fication of relation joins or graph paths, AIQL uniquely
integrates the critical primitives for attack investigation,
providing explicit constructs for spatial/temporal con-
straints, relationship specifications, constraint chaining
among system events, and the access to aggregate and
historical results in sliding time windows. Grammar 1
shows the representative rules of AIQL.
4.1 Multievent AIQL Query
For multievent queries, AIQL provides explicit lan-
guage constructs for system events (in a natural format
of {subject-operation-object}), spatial/temporal con-
straints, and event relationships.
A Running Example: Query 2 specifies an example
system behavior that probes user command history files.
Multiple context-aware syntax shortcuts (illustrated in
comments) are used, such as attribute inference and
omitting unreferenced entity IDs (details are given later).
1 agentid = 1 // unique id of the enterprise host
2 (at "01/01/2017") // time window
3 proc p2 start proc p1 as evt1
4 proc p3 read file[".viminfo" || ".bash_history"] as
evt2 // .viminfo -> name=.viminfo; omit file ID
5 with p1 = p3, evt1 before evt2
6 return p2, p1 //p2 -> p2.exe_name, p1 -> p1.exe_name
7 sort by p2, p1
Query 2: Command history probing
Global Constraints: The global constraint rule
(〈global cstr〉) specifies the constraints for all event pat-
terns (e.g., agentid and time window in Query 2).
Event Pattern: The event pattern rule (〈evt patt〉) spec-
ifies an event pattern that consists of the subject/ob-
ject entity (〈entity〉), operation (〈op exp〉), and optional
event ID (〈evt〉). The entity rule (〈entity〉) consists of en-
tity type, optional entity ID, and optional attribute con-
straints (〈attr cstr〉). Logical operators (“&&” for AND,
“||” for OR, “!” for NOT) can be used in 〈op exp〉 and
〈attr cstr〉 to form complex expressions. The optional
time window rule (〈twind〉) further narrows down the
search for the event pattern. Common time formats (US
formats and ISO 8601) and granularities are supported.
〈aiql〉 ::= 〈multievent〉 | 〈dependency〉
〈multievent〉 ::= (〈global cstr〉)* (〈m query〉)+
〈dependency〉 ::= (〈global cstr〉)* 〈d query〉
〈global cstr〉 ::= 〈cstr〉 | ‘(’ 〈twind〉 ‘)’ | 〈slide wind〉
〈twind〉 ::= ‘from’ 〈datetime〉 ‘to’ 〈datetime〉 | ...
〈slide wind〉 ::= 〈wind length〉 〈wind step〉
Multi-event query:
〈m query〉 ::= 〈evt patt〉+ 〈evt rel〉? 〈return〉 〈filter〉?
〈evt patt〉 ::= 〈entity〉 〈op exp〉 〈entity〉 〈evt〉? (‘(’
〈twind〉 ‘)’)?
〈entity〉 ::= 〈entity type〉 〈e id〉 ? (‘[’ 〈attr cstr〉‘]’)?
〈attr cstr〉 ::= 〈cstr〉
| ‘!’〈attr cstr〉
| 〈attr cstr〉 (‘&&’ | ‘||’) 〈attr cstr〉
| ‘(’ 〈attr cstr〉 ‘)’
〈cstr〉 ::= 〈attr〉 〈bop〉 〈val〉
| ‘!’? 〈val〉
| 〈attr〉 ‘not’? ‘in’ ‘(’ 〈val〉 (‘,’ 〈val〉)* ‘)’
〈op exp〉 ::= 〈op〉
| ‘!’〈op exp〉
| 〈op exp〉 (‘&&’ | ‘||’) 〈op exp〉
| ‘(’ 〈op exp〉 ‘)’
〈evt〉 ::= ‘as’ 〈evt id〉 (‘[’ 〈attr cstr〉‘]’)?
〈evt rel〉 ::= ‘with’ 〈rel〉 (‘,’ 〈rel〉)*
〈rel〉 ::= 〈attr rel〉 | 〈temp rel〉
〈attr rel〉 ::= 〈e id〉‘.’〈attr〉 〈bop〉 〈e id〉‘.’〈attr〉
| 〈e id〉 〈bop〉 〈e id〉
〈temp rel〉 ::= 〈evt id〉 (‘before’ | ‘after’
| ‘within’) (‘[’ 〈val〉‘-’〈val〉
〈timeunit〉‘]’)? 〈evt id〉
〈return〉 ::= ‘return’ ‘count’? ‘distinct’? 〈res〉
(‘,’ 〈res〉)*
〈res〉 ::= 〈e id〉(‘.’〈attr〉)?
| 〈agg func〉‘(’ 〈res〉 ‘)’
| ‘as’ 〈rename id〉
〈group by〉 ::= ‘group by’ 〈res〉 (‘,’ 〈res〉)*
〈filter〉 ::= ‘having’ 〈expr〉
| ‘sort by’ 〈attr〉 (‘,’ 〈attr〉)* (‘asc’ |
‘desc’)?
| ‘top’ 〈int〉
Dependency query:
〈d query〉 ::= ((‘forward’ | ‘backward’) ‘:’)?
(〈entity〉 〈op edge〉)+ 〈entity〉 〈return〉
〈filter〉?
〈op edge〉 ::= (‘->’ | ‘<-’) ‘[’ 〈op exp〉 ‘]’
Grammar 1: Representative BNF grammar of AIQL
Event Attribute and Temporal Relationships: The
event relationship rule (〈evt rel〉) specifies how multi-
ple event patterns are related. The attribute relationship
rule (〈attr rel〉) uses attribute values of event patterns to
specify their relationships. In Query 2, p1=p3 (inferred
as p1.id=p3.id) indicates that two event patterns evt1 and
evt2 are linked by the same entity. The temporal rela-
tionship rule (〈temporal rel〉) specifies temporal order
(“before”, “after”, “within”) of event patterns. For ex-
ample, evt1 before[1-2 minutes] evt2 specifies that evt1
occurred 1 to 2 minutes before evt2.
Event Return and Filters: The event return rule
(〈return〉) retrieves the attributes of the matched events.
Constructs such as “count”, “distinct”, “top”, “having”,
and “sort by” are provided for result manipulation and
filtering.
Context-Aware Syntax Shortcuts: AIQL includes lan-
guage syntax shortcuts to make queries more concise.
• Attribute inference: (1) default attribute names will
be inferred if users specify only attribute values in an
event pattern, or specify only entity IDs in the return
clause. We select the most commonly used attributes
in security analysis as the default attributes: name for
files, exe_name for processes, and dst_ip for networks;
(2) id will be used as the default attribute if users spec-
ify only entity IDs in attribute relationships.
• Optional ID: the ID of entity/event can be omitted if it
is not referenced in the event relationship clause or the
event return clause.
• Entity ID reuse: reusing entity IDs in multiple event
patterns implicitly means that these event patterns
share the same entity.
For example, in Query 2, ".viminfo", return p2, and p1
= p3 will be inferred as name = ".viminfo", return p2.
exe_name, and p1.id = p3.id, respectively. Query 2 also
omits the file ID in evt2 since it is not referenced. We
can also replace p3 with p1 in evt2 and omit p1 = p3.
4.2 Dependency AIQL Query
AIQL provides the dependency syntax that chains con-
straints and specifies temporal relationships among event
patterns, facilitating the specification of dependency
tracking of attacks. The syntax specifies a sequence of
event patterns in the form of a path, where nodes in the
path represent system entities and edges represent oper-
ations. The forward and backward keywords can be used
to specify the temporal order of the events on the path:
forward (backward) means the events found by the left-
most event pattern occurred earliest (latest).
1 (at "01/01/2017")
2 forward: proc p1["%/bin/cp%", agentid = 2] ->[write]
file f1["/var/www/%info_stealer%"]
3 <-[read] proc p2["%apache%"]
4 ->[connect] proc p3[agentid=3] // tracking across
host
5 ->[write] file f2["%info_stealer%"]
6 return f1, p1, p2, p3, f2
Query 3: Forward tracking for malware ramification
Query 3 shows a forward dependency query in
AIQL that investigates the ramification of malware
(info_stealer), which originates from host ha (agentid
= 2) and affects host hb (agentid = 3) through an Apache
web server. Lines 2-3 specify that p1 writes to f1, and
then f1 is read by p2. Such syntax eliminates the need
to repetitively specify the shared entity (i.e., f1) in each
event pattern. An example result may show that p3 is
the wget process that downloads the malicious script from
host hb. The operation ->[connect] at Line 4 indicates the
search will track dependencies of events across hosts.
4.3 Anomaly AIQL Query
AIQL provides the constructs of sliding time window
with common aggregation functions (e.g., count, avg, sum
) to facilitate the specification of frequency-based system
behavioral models. Besides, AIQL provides the construct
of history states, allowing queries to compare frequen-
cies using historical information.
1 (at "01/01/2017")
2 window = 1 min
3 step = 10 sec
4 proc p read ip ipp
5 return p, count(distinct ipp) as freq
6 group by p
7 having freq > 2 * (freq + freq[1] + freq[2]) / 3
Query 4: Simple moving average for network frequency
Query 4 shows an anomaly query that specifies a 1-
minute sliding time window and computes the moving
average [44] to detect network spikes (Line 7). AIQL
supports the common types of moving averages through
built-in functions (SMA, CMA, WMA, EWMA [44]).
For example, the computation of EWMA for network
frequency with normalized deviation can be expressed
as: (freq - EWMA(freq, 0.9)) / EWMA(freq, 0.9) > 0.2.
5 Query Execution Engine
The AIQL query execution engine executes the query
context generated by the parser and optimizes the query
execution by leveraging domain-specific properties of
system monitoring data. Optimizing a query with many
constraints is a difficult task due to the complexities of
joins and constraints [8]. AIQL addresses these chal-
lenges by providing explicit language constructs for spa-
tial/temporal constraints and temporal relationships, so
that the query engine can directly optimize the query ex-
ecution by: (1) using event patterns as a basic unit for
generating data queries and leveraging attribute/temporal
relationships to optimize the search strategy; (2) leverag-
ing the spatial and temporal properties of system moni-
toring data to partition the data and executing the search
in parallel based on the spatial/temporal constraints.
5.1 Query Execution Pipeline
Fig. 3 shows the execution pipeline of a multievent
query. Based on the query semantics, for every event
pattern, the engine synthesizes a SQL data query, which
searches the optimized relational databases (Sec. 3.2) for
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Figure 3: Execution of a multievent AIQL query
the matched events. The data query scheduler prioritizes
the execution of data queries to optimize execution per-
formance (Sec. 5.2). Execution results of each data query
are further processed by the executor to perform joins
and filtering to obtain the desired results. Note that by
weaving all these join and filtering constraints together,
the engine could generate a large SQL with many con-
straints mixed together. Such strategy suffers from in-
deterministic optimizations due to the large number of
constraints and often causes the execution to last for min-
utes or even hours (Sec 6.2.2). For an input dependency
query, the engine compiles it to an equivalent multievent
query for execution. For an anomaly query, the engine
maintains the aggregate results as historical states and
performs the filtering based on the historical states.
5.2 Data Query Scheduler
The data query scheduler in Fig. 3 schedules the execu-
tion of data queries. A straightforward scheduling strat-
egy (fetch-and-filter) is to: (1) execute data queries sepa-
rately and store the results of each query in memory; (2)
leverage event relationships to filter out results that do
not satisfy the constraints. However, this strategy incurs
non-trivial computation costs and memory space if some
data queries return a large number of results.
Relationship-Based Scheduling: To optimize the exe-
cution scheduling of data queries, we leverage two in-
sights based on event relationships: (1) event patterns
have different levels of pruning power, and the query
engine can prioritize event patterns with more pruning
power to narrow the search; (2) if two event patterns are
associated with an event relationship, the query engine
can execute the data query for the pattern that has more
constraints first (likely having more pruning power), and
use the execution results to constrain the execution of the
other data query.
Algorithm 1 gives the relationship-based scheduling:
1. A pruning score is computed for every event pattern
based on the number of constraints specified.
2. Event relationships are sorted based on the relation-
ship type (process events and network events are
sorted in front of file events) and the sum of the in-
volved event patterns’ pruning scores.
3. The main loop processes event relationships returned
from the sorted list, executes data queries, and gener-
ates result tuples. The engine executes the data query
whose associated event pattern has a higher pruning
score first, and leverages existing results to narrow
the search scope. To facilitate tuple management, we
maintain a map M that stores the mapping from the
event pattern ID to the set of event ID tuples that its
execution results belong to. As the loop continues,
new tuple sets are created and put into M, and old tu-
ple sets are updated, filtered, or merged.
4. After analyzing all event relationships, if there remain
unexecuted data queries, these queries are executed
and the corresponding results are put into M.
5. The last step is to merge tuple sets in M, so that all
event patterns are mapped to the same tuple set that
satisfy all constraints.
Algorithm 1: Relationship-based scheduling
Input: n data queries: Q = {qi | i≤ n, i ∈ N+}
n event patterns: E = {ei | i≤ n, i ∈ N+}
m event relationships: R = {rel(ei,e j)}
Output: Event ID tuples that satisfy all constraints
1. ∀ei ∈ E,score(ei) compute←−−−− ei;
2. Rsorted
sort←−− R;
3. Initialize empty set Exec, empty map M;
for rel(ei,e j) in Rsorted do
if ei not in Exec and e j not in Exec then
// Suppose score(ei)≥ score(e j)
Si
execute←−−−− qi; Exec.add(ei); // Si:event ID set
S j
execute←−−−−
Si
q j; Exec.add(e j);
T ← Si×S j |rel(ei ,e j); // create tuple set from
Si and S j, then filter by rel(ei,e j)
M.put(ei,T ); M.put(e j,T );
else if Either of {ei,e j} in Exec then
// Suppose ei in Exec
S j
execute←−−−−
Si
q j; Exec.add(e j);
T ←M.get(ei); T ′← T ×S j |rel(ei ,e j); // update
tuple set using S j and rel(ei,e j)
replaceVals(M,T,T ′); M.put(e j,T ′);
else
Ti←M.get(ei); Tj ←M.get(e j);
if Ti = Tj then
T ′← Ti |rel(ei ,e j); // filter tuple set
replaceVals(M,Ti,T ′);
else
T ′← Ti×Tj |rel(ei ,e j); // merge tuple sets
replaceVals(M,Ti,T ′); replaceVals(M,Tj,T ′);
4. for ei ∈ E and ei not in Exec do
Si
execute←−−−− qi; Exec.add(ei); M.put(ei,Si);
5. while unique(M.values())> 1 do
Pick Ti, Tj from M.values(), such that Ti 6= Tj;
T ′← Ti×Tj; // merge tuple sets
replaceVals(M,Ti,T ′); replaceVals(M,Tj,T ′);
6. Return unique(M.values());
Function replaceVals (M, T, T’)
Replace all values T stored in M with T ′;
Our empirical results (Sec. 6.3.2 and 6.3.3) demon-
strate that the number of constraints work well in approx-
imating the pruning power of event patterns in a broad
set of queries, even though they may not accurately rep-
resent the size of the results returned by event patterns.
Time Window Partition: The AIQL query engine lever-
ages temporal properties of the data to further speed up
the execution of synthesized data queries: the engine par-
titions the time window of a data query into sub-queries
with smaller time windows, and executes them in par-
allel. Currently, our system splits the time window into
days for a query over a multi-day time window.
6 Deployment and Evaluation
We deployed the AIQL system in NEC Labs America
comprising 150 hosts (10 servers, 140 employee sta-
tions). We performed a series of attacks based on known
exploits in the deployed environment and constructed 46
AIQL queries to investigate these attacks, demonstrat-
ing the expressiveness of AIQL. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of AIQL in supporting timely attack investiga-
tion, we evaluate the query efficiency and conciseness
against existing systems: PostgreSQL [19], Neo4j [16],
Splunk [23]. We also evaluate the efficiency offered by
our data query scheduler (Sec. 5.2) in both storage set-
tings: PostgreSQL and Greenplum. In total, our eval-
uations use 857GB of real system monitoring data (16
days; 2.5 billion events).
6.1 Evaluation Setup
The evaluations are conducted on a database server with
an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 (2.20GHz), 64GB
RAM, and a RAID that supports four concurrent read-
s/writes. Neo4j databases are configured by importing
system entities as nodes and system events as relation-
ships. Greenplum databases are configured to have 5
segment nodes that can effectively leverage the concur-
rent reads/writes of RAID. For each AIQL query (except
anomaly queries), we construct semantically equivalent
SQL, Cypher, and Splunk SPL queries. We measure
the execution time and the conciseness of each query.
Note that we omit the performance evaluation of Splunk
since the community version is limited to 500MB per
day and the enterprise version is prohibitively expensive
($1,900 per GB). Nevertheless, Splunk’s limited support
for joins [24] makes it inappropriate for investigating
multi-step attack behaviors. Due to the limited expres-
siveness of SQL and Cypher, we cannot compare the
anomaly queries (e.g., Query 5). All queries are avail-
able on our project website [1].
6.2 Case Study: APT Attack Investigation
We conduct a case study by asking white hat hackers to
perform an APT attack in the deployed environment, as
 Windows ClientMail Server DB ServerFirewall
Internet
Windows DC
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
Attacker
Figure 4: Environmental setup for the APT attack
shown in Fig. 4. Below are the attack steps:
c1 Initial Compromise: The attacker sends a crafted
email to the victim. The email contains an Excel file
with a malicious macro embedded.
c2 Malware Infection: The victim opens the Excel file
through the Outlook mail client and runs the macro,
which downloads and executes a malware (CVE-
2008-0081 [4]) to open the backdoor to the attacker.
c3 Privilege Escalation: The attacker enters the victim’s
machine through the backdoor, scans the network
ports to discover the IP address of the database, and
runs the database cracking tool (gsecdump.exe) to
obtain the credentials of the user database.
c4 Penetration into Database Server: Using the creden-
tials, the attacker penetrates into the database server
and delivers a VBScript to drop another malware,
which creates another backdoor to the attacker.
c5 Data Exfiltration: With the access to the database
server, the attacker dumps the database content using
osql.exe and sends the data dump back.
Anomaly Detectors: We deployed two anomaly detec-
tors based on existing solutions [36,52,66]. The first de-
tector is deployed on the database server, which monitors
network data transfer and emits alerts when the transfer
amount is abnormally large. The second detector is de-
ployed on the Windows client, which monitors process
creation and emits alerts when a process starts an unex-
pected child process. These detectors may produce false
positives, and we need tools like AIQL to investigate the
alerts before taking any further action.
6.2.1 Attack Investigation Procedure
Our investigation assumes no prior knowledge of the de-
tailed attack steps but merely the detector alerts. We start
with these alerts and iteratively compose AIQL queries to
investigate the entire attack sequence.
Step c5: We first examine the alerts reported by the
database server detector, and identify a suspicious ex-
ternal IP “XXX.129” (obfuscated for privacy). Existing
network traffic detectors usually cannot capture the pre-
cise process information [50,64]. Thus, we first compose
an anomaly AIQL query that computes moving average
(SMA3) to find processes which transfer a large amount
of data to this suspicious IP.
1 (at "mm/dd/2017") // date (obfuscated)
2 agentid = xxx // SQL database server (obfuscated)
3 window = 1 min, step = 10 sec
4 proc p write ip i[dstip="XXX.129"] as evt
5 return p, avg(evt.amount) as amt
6 group by p
7 having (amt > 2 * (amt + amt[1] + amt[2]) / 3)
Query 5: AIQL anomaly query for large file transfer
Query 5 finishes execution within 4 seconds and iden-
tifies a suspicious process “sbblv.exe”. We then compose
a multievent AIQL query to find the data sources for this
process (Query 6).
1 (at "mm/dd/2017")
2 agentid = xx // SQL database server (obfuscated)
3 proc p1["%sbblv.exe"] read || write file f1 as evt1
4 proc p1 read || write ip i1[dstip="XXX.129"] as evt2
5 with evt1 before evt2
6 return distinct p1, f1, i1, evt1.optype, evt1.access
Query 6: Starter AIQL query for c5
We identify a suspicious file “BACKUP1.DMP” for
f1 out of the other normal DLL files. We investigate its
creation process and find “sqlservr.exe”, which is a stan-
dard SQL server process with verified signature. Thus,
we speculate that the attacker penetrates into the SQL
server, dumps the data (“BACKUP1.DMP”), and sends
the data back to his host (“XXX.129”). We verify this by
checking that “osql.exe” process is started by “cmd.exe”
(OSQL utility is often involved in many SQL database
attacks). Query 7 gives the complete query for investi-
gating the step c5.
1 (at "mm/dd/2017")
2 agentid = xxx // SQL database server (obfuscated)
3 proc p1["%cmd.exe"] start proc p2["%osql.exe"] as
evt1
4 proc p3["%sqlservr.exe"] write file f1["%backup1.dmp"
] as evt2
5 proc p4["%sbblv.exe"] read file f1 as evt3
6 proc p4 read || write ip i1[dstip="XXX.129"] as evt4
7 with evt1 before evt2, evt2 before evt3, evt3 before
evt4
8 return distinct p1, p2, p3, f1, p4, i1
Query 7: Complete AIQL query for c5
Steps c4-c1: The investigation for c4-c1 is similar to c5,
including iterative query execution and editing. In to-
tal, we constructed 26 multievent queries and 1 anomaly
query to successfully investigate the APT attack, touch-
ing 119GB of data/422 million events.
6.2.2 Evaluation Results
As we can see, attack investigation is an iterative process
that revises queries: (1) latter iterations add more event
patterns based on the selected results from the former
queries, and (2) 4-5 iterations are needed before finding
a complete query with 5-7 event patterns. Thus, slow
response and verbose specification could greatly impede
the effectiveness and efficiency of the investigation.
End-to-End Execution Efficiency: Fig. 5 shows the
execution time of AIQL queries, SQL queries in Post-
greSQL, and Cypher queries in Neo4j. For evaluation
Table 3: Aggregate statistics for case study
Attack Step # of Queries # of Evt Patterns AIQL (s) PostgreSQL (s) Neo4j (s)
c1 1 3 3.8 3.1 10.8
c2 8 27 31.0 8038.7 10981.7
c3 2 4 15.9 15.3 3615.6
c4 8 35 61.0 10906.7 8150.6
c5 7 18 58.8 2166.5 4285.4
All 26 87 170.5 21130.3 27044.1
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Figure 5: Log10-transformed query execution time
fairness, PostgreSQL and Neo4j databases store the same
copies of data and employ the same schema and index
designs as AIQL, but they do not employ our domain-
specific data storage optimizations such as spatial and
temporal partitioning, nor our scheduling optimizations.2
Table 3 shows aggregate statistics for investigating each
attack step, including the number of queries, the number
of event patterns, and the total investigation time (sec-
ond). We observe that: (1) Neo4j generally runs slower
than PostgreSQL, due to the lack of support for effi-
cient joins; (2) PostgreSQL and Neo4j become very slow
when the query becomes complex and the number of
event patterns (hence the required table joins) becomes
large. Many large queries in PostgreSQL and Neo4j can-
not finish within 1 hour (e.g., c2-7, c2-8, c4-7, c4-8);
(3) all AIQL queries finish within 15 seconds, and the
performance of the queries grows linearly with the num-
ber of event patterns (rather than the exponential growth
in PostgreSQL and Neo4j), demonstrating the effective-
ness of our domain-specific storage optimizations and
query scheduling. (4) the total investigation time is ∼5.9
hours for PostgreSQL and ∼7.5 hours for Neo4j, which
is a significant bottleneck for a timely attack investiga-
tion. In contrast, the total investigation time for AIQL
is within 3 minutes (124x speedup over PostgreSQL and
157x speedup over Neo4j).
Conciseness: The largest AIQL query is c4-8 with 7
event patterns, 25 query constraints, 109 words, and 463
characters (excluding spaces). The corresponding SQL
query contains 77 constraints (3.1x larger), 432 words
(4.0x larger), and 2792 characters (6.0x larger). The cor-
responding Cypher query contains 63 constraints (2.5x
larger), 361 words (3.3x larger), and 2570 characters
(5.6x larger). As the attack behaviors become more
complex, SQL and Cypher queries become verbose with
many joins and constraints, posing challenges for con-
structing the queries for timely attack investigation.
2Fine-grained evaluations of the AIQL scheduling are in Sec. 6.3.
Table 4: Selected malware samples from Virussign
ID Name Category
v1 7dd95111e9e100b6243ca96b9b322120 Trojan.Sysbot
v2 425327783e88bb6492753849bc43b7a0 Trojan.Hooker
v3 ee111901739531d6963ab1ee3ecaf280 Virus.Autorun
v4 4e720458c357310da684018f4a254dd0 Virus.Sysbot
v5 7dd95111e9e100b6243ca96b9b322120 Trojan.Hooker
6.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of AIQL in both storage set-
tings (PostgreSQL and Greenplum) by constructing 19
AIQL queries for a broad set of attack behaviors, touch-
ing 738GB/2.1 billion events. Particularly, we are in-
terested in the efficiency speedup provided by the AIQL
scheduling (Sec. 5.2) in comparison with PostgreSQL
scheduling and Greenplum scheduling.
6.3.1 Attack Behaviors
Multi-Step Attack Behaviors: We asked white hat
hackers to launch another APT attack using different ex-
ploits (details available on [1]). We then constructed 5
AIQL queries for investigating the attack steps (a1-a5).
Dependency Tracking Behaviors: We performed
causal dependency tracking of origins of Chrome update
executables (d1) and Java update executables (d2). We
performed forward dependency tracking of the ramifica-
tion malware info_stealer (d3).
Real-World Malware Behaviors: We obtained a dataset
of free malware samples from VirusSign [33]. We then
randomly selected 5 malware samples (Table 4) from the
3 largest categories: Autorun, Sysbot, and Hooker. We
executed the 5 selected samples in the deployed environ-
ment and constructed AIQL queries by analyzing the ac-
companied behavior reports [33] (v1-v5).
Abnormal System Behaviors: We evaluated 6 abnor-
mal system behaviors based on security experts’ knowl-
edge: (1) s1: command history probing; (2) s2: suspi-
cious web service; (3) s3: frequent network access; (4)
s4: erasing traces from system files; (5) s5: network ac-
cess spike; (6) s6: abnormal file access. Note that for
s5 and s6, we did not construct SQL, Cypher, or Splunk
queries, due to their lack of support for sliding window
and history state comparison.
6.3.2 Efficiency in PostgreSQL
We select two baselines: (1) PostgreSQL databases that
employ our data storage optimizations (Sec. 3.2). Note
that this setting is different from the end-to-end effi-
ciency evaluation in Sec. 6.2.2, because here we want to
rule out the speedup offered by the data storage compo-
nent; (2) AIQL with fetch-and-filter scheduling (denoted
as AIQL FF; Sec. 5.2). We measure the execution time
of the 19 queries in Sec. 6.3.1.
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Figure 6: Query execution time of the scheduling employed by PostgreSQL, AIQL FF, and AIQL (single-node)
Table 5: Conciseness improvement statistics
Metrics AIQL/SQL AIQL/ Cypher AIQL/Splunk SPL
# of constraints 3.0x 2.4x 4.2x
# of words 3.9x 3.1x 3.8x
# of characters 5.3x 4.7x 4.7x
Evaluation Results: Fig. 6 shows the execution time of
queries in PostgreSQL, AIQL FF, and AIQL. We ob-
serve that: (1) the scheduling employed by PostgreSQL
is inefficient in executing complex queries. In particu-
lar, PostgreSQL cannot finish executing a2, a4, and d2
within 1 hour; (2) the scheduling employed by AIQL FF
and AIQL is more efficient than PostgreSQL, with 19x
and 40x speedup, respectively; (3) the relationship-based
scheduling employed by AIQL is more efficient than the
fetch-and-filter scheduling employed by AIQL FF.
6.3.3 Efficiency in Parallel Databases
We compare the performance of AIQL scheduling in
the Greenplum storage with the Greenplum scheduling
(i.e., running SQLs). As in Sec. 6.3.2, the Greenplum
databases also employ our data storage optimizations.
Evaluation Results: Fig. 7 shows the execution time of
queries in Greenplum and AIQL. We observe that: (1) in
most cases, our scheduling in parallel settings achieves a
comparable performance as Greenplum scheduling; (2)
in certain cases (e.g., a4, d3), our scheduling is signif-
icantly more efficient than Greenplum scheduling; (3)
the average speedup over Greenplum is 16x. The results
show that without our semantics-aware model, Green-
plum distributes the storage of events based on their in-
coming orders (which is arbitrary). On the contrary, our
data model allows Greenplum to evenly distribute events
in a host, and achieves more efficient parallel search.
6.4 Conciseness Evaluation
We evaluate the conciseness of queries that express the
19 attack behaviors in Sec. 6.3.1 in three metrics: the
number of query constraints, the number of words, and
the number of characters (excluding spaces).
Evaluation Results: Fig. 8 shows the conciseness met-
rics of AIQL, SQL, Neo4j Cypher, and Splunk SPL
queries. Table 5 shows the average improvement of
AIQL queries over other queries. We observe that AIQL
is the most concise query language in terms of all three
metrics and all attack behaviors: SQL, Neo4j Cypher,
and Splunk SPL contain at least 2.4x more constraints,
3.1x more words, and 4.7x more characters than AIQL.
In contrast to SQL, Cypher, and SPL which employ lots
of joins on tables or nodes, AIQL provides high-level
constructs for spatial/temporal constraints, relationship
specifications, constraints chaining, and context-aware
syntax shortcuts, making the queries much more concise.
7 Discussion
Query Scheduler: Our data query scheduler estimates
the pruning score of an event pattern based on its num-
ber of constraints. This can be improved by (1) consider-
ing the number of records in different hosts and different
time periods and (2) constructing a statistical model of
constraint pruning power. Additionally, the query sched-
uler may partition the time window uniformly based on
the data volume. Such strategies require further analy-
sis of the domain data statistics to infer the proper data
volume for splitting, which we leave for future work.
System Entities and Data Reduction: In the future
work, we plan to add registry entries in Windows and
pipes in Linux to expand the monitoring scope. We
also plan to incorporate more finer granularity system
monitoring, such as execution partition [58, 59] and in-
memory data manipulations [40, 43]. To handle the in-
crease of data size, we plan to explore more aggressive
data reduction techniques in addition to existing solu-
tions [55, 69] to make the system more scalable.
8 Related Work
Security-Related Languages: There also exist domain-
specific languages in a variety of security fields that
have a well-established corpus of low level algorithms,
such as threat descriptions [6,26,31], secure overlay net-
works [46, 56], and network intrusions [35, 39, 65, 68].
These languages provide specialized constructs for their
particular problem domain. In contrast to these lan-
guages, the novelty of AIQL focuses on querying attack
behaviors, including (a) providing specialized constructs
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Figure 7: Query execution time of the scheduling employed by Greenplum and AIQL (parallel)
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Figure 8: Conciseness evaluation of queries written in AIQL, SQL, Neo4j Cypher, and Splunk SPL
for system interaction patterns/relationships and abnor-
mal behaviors; (b) optimizing query execution over sys-
tem monitoring data. Splunk [23] and Elasticsearch [10]
are distributed search and analytics engine for applica-
tion logs, which provide search languages based on key-
words and shell-like piping. However, these systems
lack efficient supports for joins and their languages can-
not express abnormal behaviors with history states as
AIQL. Furthermore, our AIQL can be used to investigate
the real-time anomalies detected on the stream of sys-
tem monitoring data, complementing the stream-based
anomaly detection systems [41] for better defense.
Database Query Languages: Relational databases
based on SQL [19, 25] and SPARQL [22] provide lan-
guage constructs for joins, facilitating the specification
of relationships among events, but these languages lack
constructs for easily chaining constraints among rela-
tions (i.e., tables). Graph databases [16] provide lan-
guage constructs for chaining constraints among nodes
in graphs, but these databases lack efficient support for
joins. Similarly, NoSQL tools [38] lack efficient sup-
ports for joins. Temporal expressions are also introduced
to databases [62], and various time-oriented applications
are explored [63]. Currently, AIQL focuses on the set of
temporal expressions that are frequently used in express-
ing attack behaviors, which is a subset of the temporal
expressions proposed in [62]. More importantly, none of
these languages provide constructs to express frequency-
based behavioral models with historical results.
System Defense Based on Behavioral Analytics: Ex-
isting malware detection has looked at various ways to
build behavioral models to capture malware, such as se-
quences of system calls [67], system call patterns based
on data flow dependencies [51], and interactions between
benign programs and the operating system [53]. Behav-
ioral analytics have also shown promising results for net-
work intrusion [70,72] and internal threat detection [60].
These works learn models to detect anomaly or predict
attacks, but they do not provide mechanisms for users
to perform attack investigation. Our AIQL system fills
such gap by allowing security analysts to query histori-
cal events for investigating the reported anomalies.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a novel system for collecting attack
provenance using system monitoring and assisting timely
attack investigation. Our system provides (1) domain-
specific data model and storage for scaling the storage
and the search of system monitoring data, (2) a domain-
specific query language, Attack Investigation Query Lan-
guage (AIQL) that integrates critical primitives for attack
investigation, and (3) an optimized query engine based
on the characteristics of the data and the queries to better
schedule the query execution. Compared with existing
systems, our AIQL system greatly reduces the cycle time
for iterative and interactive attack investigation.
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